Abstract. Constructing a block cipher requires to define a random permutation, which is usually performed by the Feistel scheme and its variants. In this paper we investigate the Lai-Massey scheme which was used in IDEA. We show that we cannot use it "as is" in order to obtain results like Luby-Rackoff Theorem. This can however be done by introducing a simple function which has an orthomorphism property. We also show that this design offers nice decorrelation properties, and we propose a block cipher family called Walnut.
Designing a block cipher requires to build a random permutation from a random key. In most of block cipher constructions, we distinguish two approaches. First we use a fixed network with parallel permutations which are modified at their inputs or outputs by subkey values. This was used for instance in Safer [11] and Square [3] . Second we use the Feistel scheme [4] (or one of its variants) which starts from a random function (see Fig. 1 ). This was used for instance in DES [1] and Blowfish [14] . The literature gives an extra construction which is not in these categories and which was used in the IDEA cipher [9, 8] . It uses a simple scheme which we illustrated on Fig. 2 and which we call the "Lai-Massey scheme" throughout the paper. As for the Feistel scheme, this structure relies on a group structure. For the Feistel scheme, Luby and Rackoff [10] proved that if the round functions are random, then a 3-round Feistel cipher will look random to any chosen plaintext attack when the number of chosen plaintexts d is negligible towards 2 m 4 (where m is the block length). In this paper, we show a similar result for the Lai-Massey scheme if we add a simple function σ which has the orthomorphism property: it must be such that σ and x → σ(x) − x are both permutations.
The Luby-Rackoff result however holds when the round functions are random. This has been extended by the decorrelation theory [18, 19, 20, 21, 22] when the round function have some decorrelation property. This was used to define the Peanut construction family in which the DFC cipher [2, 5, 6] is an example. We show that we can have similar results with the Lai-Massey scheme and propose a similar construction.
Notations

Feistel and Lai-Massey Schemes
Let (G, +) be a group. Given r functions F 1 , . . . , F r on G we can define an rround Feistel scheme which is a permutation on
It is define by iterating the scheme on Fig. 1 . If r > 1, we let
(The last swap is omitted.) Similarly, given a permutation σ on G, we define an r-round Lai-Massey scheme as a permutation
in which the last σ is omitted. For more convenience, if x ∈ G 2 , we let x l and x r denote its two halves:
Advantage of Distinguishers and Best Advantage
A distinguisher A is a probabilistic Turing machine with unlimited computation power. It has access to an oracle O and can send it a limited number of queries. At the end, the distinguisher must output 0 or 1. We consider the advantage for distinguishing a random function F from a random function G defined by
Given an integer d and a random function F from a given set M 1 to a given set M 2 , we define the d-wise distribution matrix [F ] d as a matrix in R
. . . max
It has been shown that ||.|| a is a matrix norm which can compute the best advantage. Namely we have
(See [24] .) Similarly, we recursively define the ||.|| s norm by
(the norm of a matrix reduced to one entry being its absolute value) where π x1,y1 (A) denotes the matrix in
Then we have max A limited to d queries chosen plaintext and ciphertext attack
(See [24] .)
Decorrelation Biases
We also use the decorrelation bias of order d of a function in the sense of a given norm ||.|| defined by DecF
where F * is a random function uniformly distributed, and the decorrelation bias of order d of a permutation defined by
where C * is a random permutation uniformly distributed. (See [18, 20, 23, 24] .)
On the Need for Orthomorphisms
Let us first consider the Λ σ construction when σ is the identity function. Ob-
is fairly easily distinguishable with only one known plaintext. This is why we have to introduce the σ permutation.
Let us consider a one-round Lai-Massey scheme with σ:
We have
Thus, if F is uniformly distributed and σ is a permutation, then z − t is uniformly distributed. Ideally we thus require that σ and σ are permutations, which means that σ is an orthomorphism of the group. Unfortunately, the existence of orthomorphisms is not guaranteed for arbitrary groups. Actually, Hall-Paige Theorem [7] states that an Abelian finite group has an orthomorphism if and only if its order is odd or Z 2 2 is isomorphic to one of its subgroups. In particular, Z 2 m has no orthomorphism. In odd-ordered groups G, with multiplicative notations, the square σ(x) = x 2 is an orthomorphism since σ is the identity permutation and σ is a permutation (its inverse is the which is an orthomorphism when the AND of all ROTL ij (c) values is zero and the OR is 11. . .1.
1 For instance, i = 1 and c = 00 . . . 01 leads to an orthomorphism. Stern and Vaudenay used a similar construction in CS-Cipher [17] .
We thus relax the orthomorphism properties by adopting the following notion of α-almost orthomorphism.
Definition 1. In a given group G of order g, a permutation σ is called an α-almost orthomorphism if the function σ (x) = σ(x) − x is such that there are at most α elements in G with no preimage by σ .
This definition fits to Patarin's notion of "spreading" [12, 13] . We prefer here to emphasis on the approximation of orthomorphism properties.
We notice that since (σ
Here is an useful lemma.
Lemma 2. If σ is an α-almost orthomorphism over the group G, then
Proof. It is straightforward that for any set A, the number of preimages x such that σ (x) ∈ A is at most α + #A. Let n y denote the number of preimages of y.
We have Pr
First, if α = 1, for δ = 0, the number of (x, y) pairs such that σ (x)−σ (y) = δ is at most g which is equal to αg.
Let us now consider α ≥ 2. If there exists one y such that n y = α + 1, then for all other ys we have n y ≤ 1. Hence
In the other cases, we have n y ≤ α hence
Therefore, in all cases this inequality holds. We have
The number of ys such that n y = 1 is greater than g − 2α, thus the probability is less than 2αg −1 . The number of xs such that δ − σ (x) ∈ σ (G) is at most α + g − #σ (G) which is at most 2α.
As an example of almost orthomorphism in Z 2 m (which has no orthomorphism), we claim that the simple rotation ROTL is a 1-almost orthomorphism. Actually, it is a permutation, and ROTL (x) is equal to x + MSB(x) where MSB(x) denotes the most significant bit of x. The 0 value is taken twice by this function (by x = 0 and x = 11 . . . 1), the value 100. . .0 is never taken, and all the other values are taken once.
Extending the Luby-Rackoff Theorem
In order to extend Luby-Rackoff Theorem to the Lai-Massey scheme, we need the following lemma, which corresponds to Patarin's "coefficient H technique" [12, 13] . 
where g denotes the cardinality of G and C * is a random permutation of G 
The [W i = y i ] event is thus equivalent to
When the ∆U i are pairwise different, as well as the ∆V i , it is thus easy to compute the probability that we have W i = y i for all i because it relies on independent F 2 (∆U i ) and F 3 (∆V i ) uniformly distributed random variables. In addition we need all ∆y i − ∆U i to have preimages by σ . We have
which is greater than g −2d times
We notice that
The probability of having collisions with σ with two different uniformly distributed inputs is less than max(α, 1)g −1 for ∆x i = ∆x j from Equation (3). If we have ∆x i = ∆x j , then we will have ∆U i = ∆U j with probability at most αg −1 from Equation (4) since x i = x j and thus
.
, we obtain the result.
We can now state our result. 
where g is the cardinality of G and f (α) is defined as in Lemma 3.
Proof. We can assume without loss of generality that the distinguisher never request the same query twice. Let ω denote the random tape of the distinguisher A, and A be the set of all (ω, y) entries which leads to the output 1. We have
where x = (x 1 , . . . , x d ) in which x i depends on ω and (y 1 , . . . , y i−1 ). We let
We split the sum between the y entries for which the ∆y i are pairwise different, and the others. From the previous lemma we have
and p * is the probability that C * (x i ) = y i for i = 1, . . . , d. The first sum is less than , and the last probability is less than
We can then apply the same result to the symmetric distinguisher, and obtain the result.
Inheritance of Decorrelation in the Lai-Massey Scheme
We can use the same proof as in [24] for proving that the decorrelation bias of the round functions of a Lai-Massey scheme is inherited by the whole structure.
The following lemma is a straightforward application of a more general lemma from [24] .
Lemma 5. Let m be an integer, and F 1 , . . . , F r be r independent random functions on a group G. Let σ be a permutation on G. We have
where F * 1 , . . . , F * r are uniformly distributed random functions.
Following [24] , this lemma and Lemma 3 enables to prove the following corollary. 
where f (α) is defined in Lemma 3. For any set of x 1 , . . . , x d , y 1 , . . . , y 
On Super-Pseudorandomness
where g denotes the cardinality of G and C * is a random permutation of G 2 uniformly distributed, provided that d < g 2 , and f (α) is a function such that f (0) = 0 and
(F * 4 )(y i ). We can focus on the probability that all ∆Λ
Similarly as in the proof of Lemma 3, this holds but for a probability less than
We can then apply Lemma 3 to complete the proof.
This extends Theorem 4. 
where g denotes the cardinality of G and f (α) is defined in Lemma 7.
The proof is the same as in Theorem 4, but with no consideration on the ∆y i = ∆y j cases.
This shows that a 4-round random Lai-Massey scheme with an α-almost orthomorphism is a super-pseudorandom permutation when it is used less than g/ max(α, 1) times. This also extends to the following decorrelation bias upper bound. 
where f (α) is defined in Lemma 7.
A New Family of Block Ciphers
In this section we construct a new family of block ciphers called Walnut (as for "Wonderful Algorithm with Light N-Universal Transformation") Walnut is a Lai-Massey scheme which depends on four parameters (m, r, d, q) where m is the message-block length (must be even), r is the number of rounds, d is the order of decorrelation and q is an integral prime power at least 2 This provides sufficient security against differential and linear attacks for r ≥ 12.
Conclusion
We have shown that adding a simple orthomorphism (or almost orthomorphism) enables the Lai-Massey scheme to provide randomness on three rounds, and super-pseudorandomness on four rounds, like for the Feistel scheme. We have shown that we can get similar decorrelation upper bounds as well and propose a new block cipher family.
